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Abstract 
There has been a growing debate about the democratic problems and potentials of 
governance networks among political scientists and public managers. While some claim that 
governance networks tend to undermine democracy, others argue that they have the potential 
to improve and strengthen democracy. This debate is found wanting in two respects. First of 
all, there has been far too little discussion about what democracy means in relation to 
pluricentric governance networks. Second, the current debate builds on the assumption that it 
is possible to give a clear-cut answer to the question of the democratic problems and merits 
of governance networks. This assumption is highly questionable, and prevents a more 
nuanced assessment of the democratic performance of governance networks. As such, it 
diverts the focus of attention away from the fact that governance networks may be democratic 
in some respects, but undemocratic in others. Henceforth, in order to make a more precise 
assessment of the democratic quality of governance networks we need to develop normative 
criteria that permit us to measure the democratic quality of governance networks on different 
dimensions. Such criteria are developed and brought together in what we shall call a model 
for the democratic anchorage of governance networks. As illustrated by our qualitative case 
study of a multi-level and cross-border governance network involved in the recent decision to 
build a bridge between Denmark and Germany, the democratic anchorage model helps to 
assess the democratic performance of specific governance networks and to gain knowledge 
about the critical factors that determine their degree of democratic anchorage. Such 
knowledge is crucial for developing proactive strategies for enhancing the democratic 
performance of specific governance networks. 
 
1.  Introduction 
The first decade of the new millennium has seen a growing debate among political scientists 
concerning the democratic quality of governance networks (Peters and Pierre, 2000; Warren, 
2002; Sørensen, 2002; Grote and Gbiki, 2002; Skelcher, 2005; Benz and Papadopoulos, 
2006; Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Stoker, 2006; Newman, 2005; Sørensen and Torfing, 2005a). 
The initial governance debate in the 1990s was mainly preoccupied with demonstrating the 
significant role of governance networks in public governance and analysing their contribution 
to efficient and effective governance (Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Kooiman, 1993; Scharpf, 
1994; Rhodes, 1997; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Milward and Provan, 2000). 
Empirical studies (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Marsh, 1998) showed that institutionalized 
interaction among interdependent, but operationally autonomous, actors played an important 
role, not only in the implementation of public policy, but also in the process of policy 
formulation and political decision making. This means that governance networks cannot be 
reduced to managerial arenas of pragmatic problem solving. They are deeply involved in 
political processes and power games through which the authoritative allocation of values is 
determined and this produces an urgent need for a systematic assessment of the democratic 
quality of governance networks. This has prompted governance researchers to consider 
whether governance networks weaken or strengthen democracy. The answers to this pertinent 
question differ considerably. While some researchers claim that governance networks 
represent a threat to democracy because they tend to undermine the principles and institutions 
of representative democracy, others argue that governance networks help to strengthen 
democracy because they remedy crucial shortcomings in representative democracy by 
enhancing participation, deliberation and contestation (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Sørensen 
and Torfing, 2007: 233 ff).   
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The growing interest in the impact of governance networks on democracy is important and 
necessary as it places the question of the distribution and exercise of political power at the 
heart of the research agenda and helps combating the unfortunate tendency to describe and 
analyse governance networks in purely managerial terms. However, the current debate about 
the democratic quality of governance networks is found wanting in two respects. First, there 
has hardly been any discussion of what democracy means in relation to network-types of 
governance. There has been some discussion of the inclusiveness and accountability of 
governance networks, but the discussion has not produced any clear understanding of how we 
define, assess and evaluate inclusiveness and accountability. Second, the debate on 
governance networks builds on the highly problematic assumption that it is possible to give a 
clear-cut answer to the question of whether or not governance networks are democratic. This 
assumption is problematic because it prevents a nuanced debate about when, how and why 
specific governance networks are democratic. As such, the debate tends to overlook the fact 
that some governance networks are more democratic than others. A detailed analysis of the 
democratic problems and merits of specific governance networks is necessary in order to be 
able to develop adequate strategies for improving their democratic performance.  
 
A further advancement of the current debate about the democratic impact of governance 
networks requires the development of a specific set of criteria that permits us to measure the 
democratic quality of specific governance networks. In this paper we propose and elaborate a 
set of criteria that help to measure what we have elsewhere defined as the democratic 
anchorage of governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005b). The democratic 
assessment criteria will help to produce new knowledge about the various degrees of 
democratic performance of governance networks and will facilitate studies of the contextual 
and institutional factors that condition the democratic anchorage of different types of 
governance networks. Such studies will be extremely valuable in order to craft specific 
metagovernance strategies aiming to enhance the democratic performance of governance 
networks.                 
 
After having defined what we mean by governance networks and commented on the debate 
concerning their democratic impact, we present our model for the democratic anchorage of 
governance networks and use the basic dimensions of this model to elaborate a detailed set of 
criteria for measuring the extent to which governance networks are democratically anchored. 
We then use these criteria in an evaluation of the democratic anchorage of a multi-level and 
cross-border governance network that has been involved in the recent decision to build a 
bridge between Germany and Denmark – the so called ‘Femern Belt Bridge’. In the 
conclusion we briefly reflect on our attempt to apply the criteria for democratic anchorage in 
empirical analysis and compile a list some of the questions that remain to be answered in the 
search for ways of measuring the democratic performance of governance networks.    
 
2. Governance networks 
Governance networks seem to play an important role in public governance and their role is 
most likely going to augment as governance networks are increasingly seen as an effective 
and legitimate way of dealing with crosscutting and wicked problems (Van Heffen et al, 
2000; Rhodes, 2000; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2005; Marcussen and Torfing, 2007). We are 
witnessing a persistent growth in joined up governance where public agencies form 
collaborative networks with each other; a proliferation of public-private networks and 
partnerships; and a surge in networked policy interaction among different levels of 
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governance. The various governance networks take many different forms. Some networks are 
highly formalized and mandated from above, while others are informal and self-grown. Some 
are open and inclusive, while others are closed and elitist. Some pursue broad society-wide 
policy goals, while others have a narrow focus on single issues. Some are preoccupied with 
policy formulation, while others are preoccupied with policy implementation. The plurality of 
governance networks is well documented and has led to the construction of different 
typologies (Marsh and Rhodes, 1991; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997).  
 
Of course, one might ask whether the plurality and diversity of governance networks warrants 
a generic study of governance networks perceived as a distinct and unified phenomenon. 
Does it make sense to bring all the different kinds of networks together under the shared 
heading ‘governance networks’? We believe that it does, as there are some clearly 
discernable features of network-type of governance that permit us to define governance 
networks at a generic level. Hence, governance networks can be perceived as a relatively 
stable articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors who interact with 
one another through negotiations that take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and 
imaginary framework, which is self-regulating within limits set by external forces, and 
contribute to the production of public purpose (Torfing, 2005). As such, the notion of 
governance network points to the existence of mutual, flexible and situated ties among 
relevant and affected actors from state, market and civil society, who choose to pool their 
resources and coordinate their actions in the pursuit of common understandings and shared 
goals that are deemed to benefit and have value for the larger public.    
 
There is a general belief in the governance debate that the surge of network-types of 
governance can be explained by their contribution to an effective governing of our 
increasingly complex, fragmented, decentred and multi-layered societies. Without 
governance networks we would lack crucial information, fail to mobilize available resources 
and face serious coordination problems (Kooiman, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 2004). Those political scientists who have searched for ways of improving the 
democratic quality of governance networks have been driven by the assertion that governance 
networks are here to stay because we cannot do without them, and that we should, therefore, 
seek to minimise the negative impact they have on democracy as much as possible (Peters 
and Pierre, 2000). Others tend to view governance networks as a promising tool, not only for 
enhancing effective governance, but also for improving democracy (Warren, 2002; Cain, 
Dalton and Scarrow, 2003; Stoker, 2006; Sørensen, 2009). As such, it is argued that 
governance networks can help to strengthen the interaction between politicians and citizens 
between elections, supply additional channels of political influence to intensely affected 
citizens, mobilize and empower private actors, and facilitate dialogue and collaborative 
decision making among multiple demoi (Young, 2000; Sørensen and Torfing, 2005a, 2007; 
Dryzek, 2007; Esmark, 2007). However, regardless of whether governance networks are seen 
as a potential threat to democracy that should be mitigated, or as a promising contribution to 
developing a stronger democracy based on an active citizenship, there is a fundamental 
question that needs to be answered: How do we assess the democratic performance of 
governance network? In the attempt to answer this pertinent question we have developed a 
model for the democratic anchorage of governance networks. Instead of focusing on how 
governance networks might help to improve democracy at large, the democratic anchorage 
model aims to provide some basic criteria for judging the democratic quality of governance 
networks. The basic dimensions of the democratic anchorage model have already been 
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established (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005b), but the complicated process of turning the basic 
dimensions into a set of criteria that can be used in empirical assessments of specific 
governance networks is far from completed. The present paper aims to bring us a few steps 
ahead by developing a detailed set of assessment criteria and applying them to an empirical 
case.  
 
3. The democratic anchorage of governance networks 
The basic argument underlying the democratic anchorage model is that the democratic 
performance of governance networks can be ensured by anchoring the interactive policy 
making in the network in a series of relevant political constituencies that can help to lend 
democratic legitimacy to the network and in a democratic grammar of conduct that provides a 
normative yardstick for assessing the institutionalized negotiation among the network actors. 
As such, we shall claim that governance networks are democratically anchored to the extent 
that they: 1) are controlled by democratically elected politicians; 2) represent the membership 
basis of the participating groups and organisations; 3) are accountable to a territorially 
defined citizenry; and 4) facilitate interaction in accordance with a commonly accepted 
democratic grammar of conduct. 
 
The first anchorage point expresses the need to establish a close linkage between 
representative democracy and governance networks so as to ensure that the decisions of 
democratically elected politicians are not undermined by mandated or self-grown governance 
networks. However, as persistently argued by several theorists of democracy, the institutions 
of representative democracy are not capable of providing an undisputed source of democratic 
legitimacy as the link between voters and elected politicians has been systematically 
weakened by a decline in party membership, declining voter turn-out and the pervasive role 
of mass media in organizing political communication between the people and its 
representatives (Barber, 1984; Bobbio, 1987; Pitkin, 2004; Hirst, 1994; Stoker, 2006). 
Therefore, we propose that this first anchorage point is supplemented by other anchorage 
points that derive democratic legitimacy from the membership basis of the groups and 
organisations that the network actors claim to represent, from the citizens bound by the 
decisions of the network, and from a grammar of conduct that regulate the way in which 
network actors interact with each other. In fact, the model builds on the assumption that 
neither of the four anchorage points alone can ensure the democratic quality of governance 
networks. The four anchorage points compensate each others’ shortcomings and together they 
provide a strong source of democratic legitimacy. 
 
The four anchorage points re-invoke classical themes in liberal theories of democracy. 
However, as we shall see, it is necessary to reformulate the classical notions of liberal 
democracy in the context of governance networks and in the light of new theoretical insights. 
Let us consider each of the four anchorage points in turn.  
 
3.1 Anchorage in democratically elected politicians 
The basic rationale for anchoring governance networks in democratically elected politicians 
is that government control with governance networks helps to make sure that the public 
policy and governance produced by these networks is in line with the popular will expressed 
by the political majority of elected assemblies. Hence, elected politicians can lend democratic 
legitimacy to governance networks in so far as they are capable of controlling the formation, 
functioning and development of governance networks.  
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Now, the problem is that the very idea that elected politicians can control public governance 
is flawed. As evidenced by numerous policy and implementation studies in liberal 
democracies, the actual possibility of exercising top-down political control is limited 
(Lindblom, 1968; Lipsky, 1980; Behn, 2001). Contrary to what was originally suggested by 
Max Weber (1920) and Woodrow Wilson (1887) bureaucracy has failed to grant the elected 
politicians the means to ensure thorough control with the actual outputs and outcomes and, so 
far, the efforts to find new and alternative means to ensure control have been unsuccessful. 
The New Public Management reform programme is the most recent attempt to enhance 
political control with public governance from above. It aims to control outputs and outcomes 
by combining delegation and decentred self-governance with target steering, performance 
measurement, and economic incentives. However, control effects are limited due to the surge 
of unintended consequences such as blindness to that which cannot be measured, the surge of 
strategic gaming aiming to exploit the provided incentives, and a massive crowding out of 
normative and professional standards as constraints on the behaviour of street level 
bureaucrats (Sørensen, 2007; Stoker, 2008). In addition, the proliferation of quasi-
autonomous agencies and institutions seems to make political control even more difficult.  
 
The limit of the traditional notion of political control, which has been recognized, but not 
removed by the recent spell of New Public Management, becomes even more apparent in the 
context of interactive forms of governance through different kinds of networks. Governance 
networks are defined in terms of their capacity for self-regulation and the attempt to control 
governance networks through top-down steering based on rules, commands, narrow targets 
and tough sanctions will not only undermine their self-regulatory capacity (Mayntz, 1991: 
10), but will also be met by fierce resistance by the network actors, reduce their motivation to 
participate and encourage them to play safe and avoid risks. Hence, we need to rethink the 
notion of political control in order to understand how politicians can monitor and influence 
governance networks through more subtle and indirect forms of regulation that respect the 
self-regulatory character of networks.  
 
Following this line of argument, the governance network literature has aimed to reformulate 
the notion of political control in terms of metagovernance defined as the ‘regulation of self-
regulation’ (Kooiman, 2003; Jessop, 2002: 240 ff; Kickert and Koppenjan, 2004; Sørensen 
and Torfing, 2007). A reading of the literature on metagovernance points to four main forms 
of metagovernance by which elected politicians can metagovern governance networks: 
 
1. Network design that aims to influence the scope, character, composition and 
institutional procedures of networks 
2. Network framing that seeks to determine the political goals, fiscal conditions, legal 
basis, and discursive story-line of networks 
3. Network management that attempts to reduce tensions, resolve conflicts, empower 
particular actors, and lower the transaction costs by providing different kinds of 
material and immaterial inputs and resources 
4. Network participation that endeavours to influence the policy agenda, the range of 
feasible options, the decision making premises, and the negotiated outputs and 
outcomes.   
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The first and second forms of metagovernance are performed ‘hands-off’, i.e. at a distance 
from the self-regulating governance networks, whereas the third and fourth forms are carried 
out ‘hands-on’, i.e. through a close interaction between the metagovernors and the individual 
governance networks. Moreover, the first and fourth forms of metagovernance appear to be 
relatively interventionist as the metagovernor seeks to influence the content of what is being 
self-governed by the network. By contrast, the second and third forms of metagovernance 
seem to be comparatively less interventionist as they merely aim to define a space for self-
governance and support the governance network’s self-governed activities what ever the 
content might be. An overview of the basic characteristics of the four different forms of 
metagovernance is provided in table 1: 
  
Table 1: Overview of the basic characteristics of the main forms of metagovernance 
 
 Strong intervention Limited intervention 
Hands-off 1. Network design 2. Network framing 
Hands-on 4. Network participation 3. Network management 
 
 
Metagovernance of governance networks is most successful in securing well-functioning 
governance networks when combining all the available forms of metagovernance. In 
particular, metagovernors need to combine ‘hands-off’ and ‘hands-on’ metagovernance since 
the two kinds of metagovernance tend to rely on each other in order to be effective. The New 
Public Management reforms have focussed exclusively on hands-off metagovernance in an 
effort to develop self-regulating public markets and self-governing agencies through the 
design of competitive games. The result has been widespread distrust, mounting conflicts and 
lack of ownership – problems that can only be ameliorated through hands-on 
metagovernance. Likewise, efforts to metagovern hands-on through participation in and 
management of networks are ineffective if the governance network is poorly designed and 
lacks a clear purpose. These experiences suggest that hands-off and hands-on forms of 
metagovernance must supplement each other in order for metagovernance to be successful. 
 
Metagovernors must also combine forms of metagovernance that differ in terms of how much 
they intervene in the interactions of governance networks. This will enable them to respond 
to the key challenge of how to avoid both over-regulation and under-regulation of governance 
networks (Kooiman, 1993: 255). There are no ways of precisely determining the tipping point 
where metagovernance either becomes an unbearable straight jacket for the relatively self-
regulating governance networks or becomes insufficient to ensure a reasonable degree of 
coherence and coordination between representative democracy and the interactive policy 
making in specific governance networks. Nevertheless, if the metagovernors combine and 
balance interventionist forms of metagovernance with forms of metagovernance that are less 
interventionist, the chance of avoiding over- and under-regulation will tend to increase.  
 
The key question then becomes how we measure the extent to which governance networks 
are metagoverned by elected politicians. Here it might help to think about when and how 
things can go wrong. Hence, the elected politicians might not be aware that a particular 
governance network exists. This will make it impossible for them to exercise 
metagovernance. The politicians may not want to take responsibility for metagoverning 
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governance networks within their jurisdiction, and they may fail to clarify whether the 
different governance network are ‘high politics’ and therefore need a careful 
metagovernance, or whether they are ‘low politics’ bordering on administrative coordination, 
and therefore need less, or no, metagovernance. Missing or inadequate information about 
what is going on in the governance network will also prevent the exercise of metagovernance, 
and the absence of clear objectives and a failure to understand how these objectives can be 
achieved through a combination of different forms of metagovernance will undermine the 
effectiveness of actual attempts to metagovern the governance network.  Last but not least, it 
is a trivial fact that politicians are overburdened and often leave metagovernance to the public 
administrators. Failure to coordinate with the public administrators creates an imminent risk 
of inconsistent and conflicting messages from the public metagovernors that will seriously 
hamper the effects of metagovernance. 
 
Reversing the arguments about metagovernance failure permits us to formulate a list of 
positively formulated norms that can help us to measure whether governance networks are 
democratically anchored in elected politicians. The metagovernance norms are summarized 
in proposition 1. 
 
 
 
Proposition 1. Democratic anchorage in elected politicians can be measured by paying 
attention to the following norms: 
 
• The elected politicians must be aware of the presence, role and character of the 
governance network in question, and have access to information about its processes, 
outputs and outcomes  
• They must assume the role of metagovernors and decide how important it is to 
metagovern the network in order to ensure its sustainability, influence its processes, 
outputs and outcomes, and enhance its democratic performance 
• They must define the objectives of their metagovernance and combine different forms 
of metagovernance to achieve these objectives 
• They must cooperate with the public administrators in order to develop a joint 
metagovernance strategy and coordinate their actions 
 
 
 
3.2 Anchorage in the membership basis of participating groups and organisations 
The rationale for anchoring governance networks in the membership basis of participating 
groups and organisations is that the members of these groups and organisations constitute a 
‘demos’ of directly affected people that the different network actors must represent in order 
for the governance network to obtain democratic legitimacy (Sørensen and Torfing, 2003: 
617). Governance networks provide an arena for negotiated interaction between actors who 
implicitly or explicitly represent a plurality of informal groups and/or formal organisations. 
The interactive policy processes in governance networks are democratically legitimate in so 
far as the participating actors represent the interests, preferences and opinions of the members 
of these different groups and organisations.  
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However, the classical notion of representation is problematic as it wrongly assumes that a 
pre-defined interest or preference is reproduced in an undistorted way at the level of 
representation (Laclau, 1993; Saward, 2005). The idea of an unbiased one-to-one 
representation of a pre-given interest or preference is not only difficult to realize in network-
based policy processes, but is also theoretically flawed as it presupposes the presence of a 
fully constituted object of representation and assumes that the process of representation does 
not add anything to the object of representation. By contrast, we shall contend that the 
interests and preferences to be represented are never fully constituted since they are formed 
within a particular discursive context that is constantly destabilized by dislocatory events that 
reveal the ultimately undecidable character of all social and political identities. As such, the 
interests and preferences of political actors are always marked by the non-totalizable 
openness of the policy discourse in which they are formed (Laclau, 1990, 1993).  
 
The ultimate failure to construct a fully constituted preference or interest means that the 
performative act of representation in governance networks becomes constitutive of the 
interests and preferences that it represents. The interests and preferences of the participating 
groups and organisations are defined by the way they are articulated by their representatives 
in the governance network. There might be a discrepancy between how these preferences and 
interests are conceived and articulated within the membership basis and how they are 
constructed in the representational space of the governance network. However, the 
constructed representations cannot be seen as a mere distortion of some primordial object 
since there never was a fully constituted interest or preference in the first place, but only a 
vague and ambiguous ensemble of conceptions, wants and beliefs. Therefore, the relation 
between the network representatives and the constituency that they claim to represent must be 
evaluated in terms of the degree to which the represented identify with the representatives 
(Saward, 2005). The crucial question is not whether the discursive forms of representation in 
the governance network distort some true and original interest or preference, but rather 
whether those who the representatives claim to represent identify themselves with the 
performative act of representation (Torfing, 1999: 183 ff). 
 
The crucial challenge for the attempt to democratically anchor governance networks in the 
membership basis of affected groups and organisations through the establishment of a 
relation of representation is to avoid tying the representatives on their hands and knees 
through the issuing of closely defined mandates. It is virtually impossible to participate in 
political negotiations within a governance network on the basis of a closely defined mandate. 
Participation in governance networks not only requires the ability to give and take in relation 
to a given set of preferences or interests, but also the possibility of developing and responding 
to new political initiatives that modify and change the articulated preferences and interests 
through power-ridden forms of deliberation. Therefore, the best way of ensuring 
representation is through an ex-post critique of the way in which the representatives represent 
and pursue particular interests and preferences. In representative democracy such an ex-post 
critique is institutionalized through the ballot box, but when it comes to governance networks 
this is not an option. Here ex-post critique must take place through the presence of situations 
in which the network actors are forced to create and recreate points of identification for the 
groups and organisations they claim to represent. 
 
However, capacities and opportunities for ex-post critique are just one among several 
conditions for ensuring identification with the representatives in governance networks. First 
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of all, the participants in the governance network must advance more or less concrete and 
direct claims to represent specific groups that are affected by the negotiated interaction in the 
governance network (Saward, 2005: 191). The advancement of such claims is important in 
order for the network actors to become recognized as a legitimate player by the other actors 
in the network. However, it is not enough that the other network actors envisage these claims 
to represent. The represented groups and organisations must be aware of the claims to 
represent and must identify with these claims by constructing a ‘we’-relationship to the 
representative. The ‘we’-identity does not construct a complete identity, but rather a 
‘sameness’ that permits disagreements up to the point where the ‘we’ is replaced by an ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ division. The represented groups and organisations must have the necessary 
capacities to critically evaluate the way in which the representatives construct and pursue 
particular interests and preferences and there must be regular opportunities for the 
represented to assess the performance of their representatives and express grievances and 
criticisms. Identification can be maintained despite of criticisms if the representatives 
demonstrate their willingness to listen, learn and adjust their performance in the governance 
network, or persuade the critics to change their views.    
 
We can now propose a list of positively formulated norms that can help us to measure 
whether governance networks are anchored in participating groups and organisations. The 
norms are summarized in proposition 2. 
 
 
Proposition 2. Democratic anchorage in participating groups and organisations can be 
measured by paying attention to the following norms: 
 
• Network actors must advance claims to represent specific groups and/or organisations 
• The represented groups and/or organisations must be aware of these claims and accept 
their validity by constructing a ‘we’-relationship to the representative(s) 
• The represented groups and/or organisations must have the capacity and opportunity to 
critically evaluate the way that their interests and preferences are constructed and 
pursued by the representative(s) 
• The representative(s) must be sensitive to criticisms from the represented  
 
 
 
3.3 Anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry 
The basic rationale for anchoring governance networks in a territorially defined citizenry 
derives from the fact that democratic legitimacy is not only obtained by  being accountable to 
a demos constituted by the groups and organisations that are directly affected by the decisions 
made by a particular governance network. Governance networks must also be accountable to 
a wider territorially defined demos constituted by citizens who are indirectly affected by the 
decisions made by the governance network, for example, because the decisions affect the 
overall allocation of resources, or because they have repercussions for other policy sectors. 
The citizens who live within the local, regional, national or transnational territory in which a 
certain governance network is setting the agenda or making binding decisions should be able 
to hold that particular governance network accountable for its policy outputs and policy 
outcomes. Of course, the elected politicians help to anchor governance networks in the 
territorially defined citizenry, but there is a long way from a group of concerned and 
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discontented citizens to the responsible governance network, if the citizens have to seek 
influence through the election of politicians who may or may not metagovern the governance 
network. Indeed, citizens should have a shorter and more direct way of holding a particular 
governance network publicly accountable for its contribution to public governance. 
 
The classical notion of public accountability assumes that the responsible political decision 
makers can be identified and held to account for an inappropriate policy output and an 
unacceptable policy outcome. However, the problem with this assumption is that the presence 
of complex causalities often makes it impossible to determine the reason why an attempt to 
solve a problem or exploit new opportunities fail. There is always the possibility that 
contingent circumstances beyond anyone’s control caused the policy failure. Even in those 
cases where the policy outcome seem to derive from a certain policy output the causal link 
between the policy output and the policy decisions that brought it about can be highly 
uncertain as political decisions are often ambiguous, inconsistent and subject to competing 
administrative interpretations. As such, the idea of a one-to-one correspondence between 
decision, output and outcome is problematic. 
 
This fundamental causality problem related to the traditional notion of accountability 
undermines the well-established claim that representative democracy is capable of ensuring a 
high level of democratic accountability. However, the difficulties with ascertaining 
democratic accountability becomes even more outspoken with regard to governance 
networks. First of all, it is often hard to identify clear-cut decisions in governance networks 
as decisions are a result of complex and informal interactions in which problems, solutions, 
decision-making premises and implementation strategies are loosely coupled and subject to 
ongoing revisions. Second, if and when policy outputs are visible it is often difficult to 
establish who precisely were responsible for making the policy decisions. Governance 
networks seldom retreat to voting, but the network actors tend to bargain and deliberate until 
there is established a ‘rough consensus’ in terms of a satisfactory decision that is tacitly 
accepted, despite minor protests and grievances. This makes it difficult to see who supported 
a particular policy decision. A solution could be to hold the whole governance network to 
account for a particular output or outcome, but that could be seen as unfair by those who 
tacitly accepted the decision, despite serious reservations and persistent criticisms. Finally, no 
matter whether it is the individual network actors or the whole governance network that are 
hold to account, the attempt to sanction problematic and inappropriate decisions is 
exceedingly difficult. Since the network actors are not elected, but most often appointed, or 
even self-appointed, they cannot be voted out in the next election. There might be other ways 
of excluding individual network actors, but many organisations tend to monopolize 
representation of particular groups and this renders it impossible to find qualified substitutes 
for those who are excluded. Politicians might choose to cut back funding and reduce the 
scope and influence of governance networks that are responsible for clear and discernable 
policy failures. However, such a reaction will merely tend to dismantle the governance 
network and replace it with more hierarchical forms of top-down government. A less drastic 
response would be for the politicians to publicly scorn the governance networks through what 
is generally known as ‘naming and shaming’. Although this might be a viable strategy in 
terms of ensuring the survival of the governance network, the effect will often be rather 
limited as the scope of the network actors to plead ‘not guilty’ is relatively large. 
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However, the problems related to meeting the democratic demand for the public 
accountability of governance networks should not make us give up the fundamental ambition 
of facilitating public contestation of political decisions taken by governance networks. 
Facilitation of public contestation is a must if we are to prevent governance networks from 
degenerating into closed and secret clubs that operate in the dark and without public approval 
(Fox and Miller, 1995: 118 ff; Newman, 2005; Dryzek, 2007). Public contestation basically 
involves public debate and critical scrutiny of the ways policy problems are defined; the 
listing and framing of alternative policy options; the procedures that lead to the choice of a 
particular option; and the direct and indirect results of the implemented policy. In other 
words, governance networks and the participating actors must provide public accounts of 
why, how and with which result they do what they do, and they must engage in public 
dialogue with their opponents and be sensitive to the criticisms that are raised. What we are 
talking about here is a new kind of narrative accountability whereby the governance 
network’s accounts are publicly contested by critical counter-accounts (March and Olsen, 
1995: 141 ff). 
 
The relevant counterpart of the governance network is the accountability holding citizens 
within a certain territory, but we should not be under the spell of the illusion that all citizens 
will have their eyes tightly fastened on the decision making, policy outputs and policy 
outcomes of a vast number of governance networks in order to criticize what they find wrong 
or wanting. We will have to content ourselves with the critical engagement of mass media, 
scientific and professional experts, interest organisations, social movements, competing 
governance networks, and politically interested and empowered individuals. Public audit and 
critical scrutiny require a certain amount of resources, capacities and political interest, which 
we cannot commonly expect to find among ordinary citizens, and least of all in unorganized 
groups of citizens with low education and income. The public contestation of a governance 
network is therefore often carried out by a diverse group of more or less organized elite 
citizens. The active engagement and critical scrutiny on the part of different kinds of sub-
elites (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993) is of central importance to a successful democratic anchorage of 
governance networks in a territorially defined citizenry. 
 
There are three crucial requirements that must be fulfilled in order to facilitate public 
contestation of the narrative accounts produced by governance networks and the participating 
organisations and groups. The first requirement is transparency. Governance networks and 
their tasks, remit and composition should be fully visible to the general public, and they must 
produce regular public accounts for why and how they arrived at particular decisions, and 
what the results have been. The public accounts should be comprehensive, informative and 
accessible for lay people. Overly brief policy statements, misleading figures and arguments, 
and a specialized, or technical, jargon will leave the citizens in the dark as to what goes on in 
a governance network. 
 
The second requirement is access to public dialogue with governance networks. The narrative 
accounts of the deeds of various governance networks can be made publicly available on the 
internet, or through policy reports, hearings, press meetings, mass media coverage, or 
availability of the key network actors in accessible public spaces where they can meet the 
citizens face to face. If there are citizens who, at some point, want to take issue with the 
figures, arguments and stipulations presented in the publicly available network accounts, they 
must have the possibility for engaging in a dialogue with the members of the governance 
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network in question. The citizens should be able to ask questions, raise concerns, advance 
criticisms and organize protests, and the members of the governance network should respond 
by giving additional accounts that address the issues raised by the citizens.  
 
The third requirement is responsiveness on the part of the governance network. It does not 
help much to foster a critical dialogue between the members of a governance network and a 
territorially defined citizenry, if the former are unwilling to take eventual criticisms into 
account by adjusting the course of action. Public contestation is reducible neither to the 
repressive tolerance of critical voices nor to a polite dialogue with no effect. Public 
contestation must be played out in a way that promotes responsiveness on the part of the 
governance network. Just as the critical citizens must be prepared to learn that their criticisms 
are ill-founded or misguided, governance network actors must be prepared to respond 
positively to constructive proposals, to make concessions, or at least to compensate the losers. 
One of the ways of promoting a two-way responsiveness is to ensure that the dialogue 
between citizens and a governance network is initiated in the early stages of the policy 
process and continued later on. If the public contestation emerges in the final stages of the 
policy process where carefully calibrated compromises have been formed and political deals 
have been struck, the propensity of the network actors to listen to criticisms and consider new 
alternatives will be extremely low. 
  
The three requirements presented above help us to measure the degree to which governance 
networks are democratically anchored in indirectly affected citizens and sub-elites who 
subject the outputs and outcomes of the networked policy process to public contestation. As 
such, we can now draw up a list of norms for measuring the democratic anchorage of 
governance networks in the territorially defined citizenry. The norms are summarized in 
proposition 3. 
 
 
Proposition 3. Anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry can be measured by 
paying attention to the following norms: 
 
• The tasks, remit and composition of a governance network must be fully visible to the 
general public 
• The governance network must produce regular narrative accounts that seek to justify its 
decisions, actions and results in the eyes of the broader citizenry 
• The participants in the governance network must engage in a constructive dialogue with 
those who are publicly contesting their decisions, actions and results   
• The governance network must show some level of responsiveness towards criticisms and 
alternative proposals raised in the public debate 
 
 
 
3.4 Anchorage in democratic rules and norms 
The basic rationale for anchoring governance networks in democratic rules and norms is to 
ensure that governance networks are not only democratically anchored in external political 
constituencies, but also in a set of democratic standards regulating the processes and 
interactions that take place within the network. The democratic quality of a governance 
network also depends upon the degree to which the network actors follow rules and norms 
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inherent to a democratic grammar of conduct (Mouffe, 1993). In the same way as the call for 
‘justice’ provides the basis for the deconstruction of actual ‘laws’ that are never just enough 
(Derrida, 1992), the call for a ‘democracy-to-come’ provides the basis for the deconstruction 
of historical forms and accounts of democracy (Derrida, 1994). However, in order to assess 
the democratic character of actual forms of governance, we need to invest the ungraspable 
vision of a ‘democracy-to-come’ in a set of contingent democratic standards that can be used 
in concrete evaluations and assessments. The democratic rules and norms that are relevant for 
an assessment of the structure, functioning and outcomes of governance networks can be 
derived from many different currents of democratic theory. Some can be traced back to the 
aggregative and integrative strands of liberal democratic theories (March and Olsen, 1989), 
whereas others are rooted in the new post-liberal theories of democracy (Sørensen and 
Torfing, 2005a). The interweaving of theoretical discussions of how to define democracy and 
political discussions of how to institutionalize democratic forms of governance in the present 
societies means that democratic rules and norms are subject to endless dispute. Hence, the 
attempt to draw up a complete or unbiased list of democratic norms and rules is doomed to 
fail. At best we can draw up an open-ended list of relevant and commonly accepted, but 
ultimately contingent, rules and norms that can help us to assess the democratic performance 
of governance networks. 
 
However, admitting the incomplete and ultimately political character of the democratic rules 
and norms that constitute the democratic grammar of conduct in most Western societies still 
leaves us with another and even more delicate problem of what it means to follow democratic 
rules and norms. We might be able to show that some rules and norms are relevant, 
consistent and necessary for ensuring democratic decision making in governance networks, 
but we cannot expect governance networks and the political actors, who inhabit them, to 
follow such rules in a mechanical way. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1986) has taught us that rule-
following is not as simple as it may seem. When the network actors have succeeded to match 
a given situation with a certain rule, defined by an institutionalized logic of appropriateness 
(March and Olsen, 1989), the problems have only just begun. For as Wittgenstein (1986) 
demonstrates, rules are structurally ambiguous and there are always numerous ways to follow 
a particular rule. The search for another rule that can help us to clarify the content of the first 
rule leads to an infinite regress which we can only avoid by making our own constitutive 
reformulation of the different rules we encounter on our way. In that case rules become 
merely an instance of their usage, although there are clearly limits to this usage since the 
actors must be able to show that they act in accordance with the rules they encounter (Staten, 
1985). This means that the democratic rules and norms that are supposed to govern political 
institutions, and hence also governance networks, can only be followed in and through a 
concrete and situational re-enactment. 
  
The democratic grammar of conduct that is supposed to govern the pragmatic and contextual 
re-enactment of rules and norms includes three kinds of normative regulations that relate to 
the formation, functioning and outcome of governance networks. The first kind of normative 
regulations relate to the democratic demand for the inclusion of the affected actors. The norm 
that the affected actors should be able to influence the decisions that affect them is inherent to 
the democratic idea of the self-government of the people. In territorially defined 
representative democracies the contingent and political character of the demarcation of the 
affected in terms of all the competent citizens within the national borders is less apparent than 
in the functionally defined governance networks. Who are affected by a governance network, 
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how intensely they are affected, and whether or not they are sufficiently affected to become 
included in the governance network is a highly contested issue that is frequently subject to 
fierce political battles. Since governance networks are always predicated on the inclusion and 
exclusion of more or less affected actors and since formal inclusion does not guarantee 
political influence, we need to further qualify the generally accepted norm about the inclusion 
of the affected actors (Young, 2000; Fung and Wright, 2003; Saward, 2005; Dryzek, 2007; 
Sørensen, 2008). The first rule should be to ensure that there is an ongoing debate about who 
should be included and excluded. The lines of demarcation that separate the inside from the 
outside should not be determined once and for all, but should be constantly renegotiated. The 
second rule is that the negotiated criteria of inclusion and exclusion are transparent and 
consistently applied. The excluded actors should be able to discern and contest the reasons 
why they are not included. The third rule is that all the intensely affected actors that can and 
will contribute to the networked policy process are included in the network. Of course, 
everything will depend on how the ‘intensity’ of the affectedness is determined. In most cases 
‘intensity’ will be a matter of degrees, and the same goes for inclusion as it is possible to 
distinguish the core group of participants from more peripheral groups of participants. 
Therefore, the rule might be that the more intensely affected an actor is, the closer to the core 
group of participants the actor should be. The final rule should be that none of the formally 
included actors must be marginalized in a way that systematically prevents them from 
influencing the actual decisions of the network (Young, 2000). Hence, the political agenda 
and the story-line, which defines the policy problems and the range of appropriate policy 
solutions, should be defined in broad terms that are open for reformulation and 
reinterpretation, and thereby facilitate actors with different views and preferences to put forth 
claims and ideas that are deemed valid and not a priori excluded from the table of negotiation 
(Hajer, 1995; Torfing, 2007). 
 
The second kind of normative regulations concerns the demand for democratic deliberation 
based on agonistic respect for other people’s opinions; commitment to reach a rough 
consensus; and a relatively transparent decision making process. All the actors in the network 
should have an opportunity to express their views without being censored by demands that 
one should be reasonable, articulate, moderate, civilized, etc. (Young, 2000), and if they 
cannot find adequate support for their views they should be free to leave the governance 
network and form, or become part of, another network. Moreover, network actors with 
conflicting views should not treat each others as enemies to be extinguished by all possible 
means, but rather see each other as adversaries who might strongly disagree with each other, 
but who respect each others’ right to voice an opinion (Mouffe, 2005). The network actors 
may attempt to influence each other by means of controlling the agenda setting, persuading 
and confronting each other, or manipulating their opponents’ subjective perception of their 
interests (Lukes, 1974). But no matter how much they struggle and bargain with each other, 
they should be committed to try reaching an inclusive compromise in the shape of a ‘rough 
consensus’, where minor differences and grievances remain, but are tolerated. Finally, 
decisions about public policy and governance should be reached through a relatively 
transparent process where everybody knows the terms of the debate, the options and the final 
decisions. Hence, standard procedures for ensuring decision making transparency through 
written agendas and minutes and a clear and visible leadership should be observed. 
 
The third kind of normative regulations concerns the demand for a democratic improvement 
of the interactive system of governance. This can be obtained by ensuring that the 
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interactions within the governance network contribute to developing the democratic identities 
of the participating actors and to augmenting their political empowerment. It can also be 
obtained through self-reflexive political processes that stimulate an active search for new 
democratic mechanisms that can contribute to a further democratization of the public policy-
making processes. Democracy never reaches a final form, neither as a perfect set of 
institutions, nor as a regulative idea. Democracy must be constantly developed through a 
plurality of creative, partial and experimental methods, and governance networks should be 
judged on their ability to facilitate such a development (Dewey, 1927).  
 
The three kinds of normative regulations help us to measure the democratic anchorage of 
governance networks in a democratic grammar of conduct. The norms for measuring the 
degree to which governance networks are anchored in a set of democratic rules and norms are 
summarized in proposition 4. 
 
 
Proposition 4. Democratic anchorage in democratic rules and norms can be measured 
by paying attention to the following norms: 
 
• Inclusion and exclusion must be subject to ongoing negotiations and these negotiations 
should result in explicit criteria for inclusion and exclusion that should be consistently 
applied in relation to all potential actors 
• The degree of inclusion in governance networks should be a function of the intensity of 
the actors’ affectedness and the included actors should be able to influence the decisions 
made by the governance network 
• The deliberation within governance networks must be governed by a democratic ethos 
that ensures agonistic respect, commitment to reach a rough consensus, and a relatively 
transparent decision making process 
• Participation in the governance network must contribute to the enhancement of the 
political empowerment of the actors 
• The governance network must stimulate democratic innovation through self-reflexive 
and experimental processes  
   
 
 
4. Applying the democratic anchorage model  
The four propositions outlined above aim to translate the key dimensions in the original 
model of democratic anchorage (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005b) into a more detailed set of 
democratic norms that can be used in empirical assessments of the democratic quality of 
governance networks. Evaluation of the democratic performance of governance networks is 
important in order to determine the democratic potential of the new interactive forms of 
governance. A democratic auditing of governance networks that provides a nuanced and 
contextualized understanding of their democratic merits and problems may also help 
politicians and executive managers to develop tailor-made strategies for improving their 
democratic quality. 
 
In principle, a governance network can be evaluated on the basis of all the dimensions and 
norms explicated above, and as a general rule the more politicized a governance network is, 
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the more important it is that it performs well on the different dimensions and norms of the 
model. However, we cannot expect governance networks to perform equally well on all four 
dimensions. Not only have we set the bar high, but there are also structural conditions 
pertaining to their form and functioning that will prevent governance networks from doing 
equally well in relation to all four anchorage points. Hence, when evaluating and comparing 
the democratic anchorage of different governance networks we should bear in mind that 
certain types of governance networks are likely to do quite well in relation to certain 
anchorage points while doing less well in relation to other anchorage points. In other words, 
we need to contextualize the assessment of the democratic anchorage of governance networks 
in order to make sure that we focus on the most pertinent anchorage points in our empirical 
assessment of a particular governance network.  
 
Now, the fourth anchorage point that insists that the negotiated interaction within a 
governance networks should be anchored in a democratic grammar of conduct is relevant and 
important in relation to all kinds of governance networks. Hence, a governance network that 
fails to re-enact commonly accepted democratic rules and, therefore, tend to make 
undemocratic decisions is highly problematic and calls for some kind of political 
intervention. However, the relevance and importance of the other three anchorage points 
depend on the form and functioning of the governance network in question. 
 
The first anchorage point that emphasizes the need to anchor governance network in 
metagoverning politicians is more relevant for governance networks that are mandated from 
above than for governance networks that are self-grown from below. As such, it is will often 
be very difficult for elected politicians and public managers to metagovern self-grown 
governance networks that merely consist of individual citizens, civil society organisations 
and private business firms. From a democratic point of view, metagovernance strategies 
aiming to ensure the three other anchorage points might be badly needed, but public 
authorities will have great difficulties legitimizing even the most indirect and subtle forms of 
interference with a private, self-grown governance network. The exceptions to this general 
rule are those cases where an overly private, self-grown governance network is publicly 
funded, has been delegated competence to solve public tasks, or tend to make political 
decisions of great importance to the wider community. In these cases public metagovernance 
is important and warranted, but private, self-grown governance networks that are merely 
engaged in a self-regulated governance of civil society should enjoy an outstretched 
autonomy and, therefore, cannot be expected to perform well in relation to the first anchorage 
point. 
 
The second anchorage point that aims to anchor governance networks in the membership 
basis of the participating groups and organisations is more relevant for governance networks 
engaged in policy formulation than for governance networks that are merely engaged in 
knowledge sharing or policy implementation. Hence, if the governance networks make 
authoritative decisions that are important for the groups and organisations that are represented 
in the governance networks or if these groups and organisations are expected to deliver active 
support and resources to the governance network, then the anchorage of the network actors in 
their hinterland is extremely important. By contrast, if the governance networks are merely 
preoccupied with exchanging relevant information, or coordinating the actions of different 
groups and organisations in order to prevent implementation problems, then a firm anchorage 
in the membership basis is maybe not so important, although one might argue that anchorage 
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in the membership basis is always important and that it is up to the members themselves to 
determine how much attention they will pay to an implementation network. 
.          
The third anchorage point that insists on anchoring the output and outcome of governance 
networks in a territorially defined citizenry is highly relevant for governance networks that 
are involved in decision making with widespread repercussions for other policy areas and 
large sections of the population within different jurisdictions. By contrast, governance 
networks that deal with relatively isolated problems of little concern for lay people cannot be 
expected to be firmly anchored in a critical public scrutinizing the policy decisions of the 
network. 
 
Although it is impossible to make hard and fast rules for the relevance of the different 
anchorage points, the reflections presented above make it clear that the application of the 
elaborated model of the democratic anchorage is by no means a mechanical and instrumental 
endeavour. The democratic anchorage model provides a list of norms that are relevant and 
important for the measurement of the democratic quality of governance networks, but the 
application of the model and the evaluation of the results, which will always be mixed and a 
matter of degrees, should always be contextualized and take into account what kind of 
governance network that we are trying to assess.  
 
5. Measuring the democratic anchorage of the Femern Belt Network1 
The proof of the pudding lies in eating it. Therefore, we shall aim to show how the normative 
criteria that have been elaborated above can be applied in an empirical measurement of the 
democratic anchorage of a specific governance network. The governance network that we 
have chosen for this purpose is the Danish ‘Femern Belt Forum’ that has played an important 
role in promoting the recent decision to build a bridge between Denmark and Germany. 
 
The first concrete effort to reach an agreement about a bridge over the Femern Belt 
separating Denmark and Germany was made at a summit meeting between the Danish Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2006, but 
despite high hopes on the part of the governance network there was not reached any 
agreement. This lead to a high level of frustration among the network actors who felt that 
they had been very close reaching the goal that they had worked for since the early 1990s – 
and then failed in the end. However, frustration was turned into applause and victory on the 
29th of June 2007 when a bilateral government agreement to build a Femern Belt Bridge was 
finally signed. The bilateral agreement states that the new Femern Belt bridge is to be paid 
for by user fees (bridge toll) and that the Danish government will cover all costs in case of 
unforeseen fiscal problems. The EU has promised to cover 20% of the total costs. 
  
The history of the Femern Belt project is intriguing. The suggestion of building a bridge 
between Germany and Denmark goes a long way back. The first idea of a bridge over the 
Femern Belt emerged in the 14th century, and the more concrete plans to establish a road 
connection all the way down from the north of Scandinavia to Germany were advanced as 
early as 1914 (Bech, 1914). The plans were further developed in the 1940s and 1950s 
(Danish Railroad Company, 1940; Erngaard, 1952), and after a relatively quiet period in the 
                                                 
1
 The empirical data on which this analysis is based has been collected over a two year period and includes 
qualitative interviews, document studies and observations of meetings and events.   
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1970s and 1980s the idea of a Femern Belt bridge resurfaced in connection with the building 
of the Big Belt Bridge and the Oresund Bridge in the 1980s and the 1990s. The building of 
the Oresund Bridge connecting Denmark and Sweden meant that the Femern Belt Bridge 
could be re-launched as the ‘missing link’ that needed to be built in order to realize the old 
dream about a road connection between Scandinavia and Germany.   
 
In the early 1990s a group of local actors in southern Zealand, and the small islands to the 
south of Zealand, formed a governance network with the declared goal of lobbying for the 
building of a bridge between the small Danish town Rødby and the Femern peninsula in 
Germany. The initiative to the formation of the network was taken by some of the local 
mayors and a group of public administrators in the County, who saw a Femern bridge as a 
central means to promote economic growth in the southern region of Zealand that was 
suffering from economic decline and mass unemployment. The Femern Belt network aimed 
to influence the politicians in the national parliament and the national government who – 
apart from the Minister of Traffic, Flemming Hansen who strongly supported a Femern 
bridge – had shown a limited interest in the project. The reluctance of the political parties in 
the Danish parliament was due to the fact that most of them had members of parliament from 
Jutland who saw highway construction in Jutland as the most important infrastructural task. 
In order to influence the government, the county asked the former Minister of Industry, Nils 
Wilhjelm, to chair the Femern Belt Forum. His had strong connections to influential national 
politicians, and his ability to negotiate and get results was widely recognized. The multi-level 
governance network, which was initially called the ‘Idea Committee for Infrastructure’, was 
formally established in 1994 (County of Southern Zealand, 2000), and has been active ever 
since, although it has undergone several reorganisations.2  
 
In the beginning of 1990s the governance network was met by political opposition on the 
Danish side from environmentalists, ferry workers and some members of parliament who for 
different reasons were against a bridge. However, the opposition on the Danish side was 
relatively moderate. The much stronger opposition came from Germans who either found a 
bridge to Denmark useless, or feared that a bridge would have negative effects on tourism. 
While the Danish opposition has remained marginal and even diminished over the years, the 
main challenge for the governance network, apart from increasing the active support for the 
project among the politicians in the Danish parliament, has been to convince the people on 
Femern that a bridge to Denmark is a good idea. In order to do this the Femern Belt Forum 
has worked closely together with a recently formed ‘Femern Belt Forum’ on the German 
side. The intensified cross-border cooperation has aimed to build a ‘mental bridge’ between 
the two countries (Forum Programme, 2003). The German resistance is still there, but after 
the bilateral agreement to build a Femern Belt Bridge was signed, the discussion has changed 
from the question of whether or not to build the bridge to the question of how to prepare the 
cross-border region for the new bridge, both in the immediate construction phase and in the 
time after that. The main issues in the current debate are how to avoid bottlenecks in the 
                                                 
2
  The first reorganization took place in 2001 when a small Executive Committee is formed. The second 
reorganization took place in 2003 when the network was re-named as the Femern Belt Forum and became 
supported by its own administrative secretariat (Raahavegaard). The last reorganization took place in 2006 after 
a huge amalgamation reform that reduced the number of municipalities from 275 to 98 and replaced the old 14 
counties with 5 new regions. This reform triggered a re-composition of the Femern Belt Forum and the 
establishment of a new competing network named ‘Ad hoc-committee Femern Belt’ initiated by one the new 
and larger municipality in Lolland where the bridge will begin.  
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labour market and how to ensure that the bridge will foster a sustained economic growth in 
the local communities.  
 
The latest development has been that a small opposition in the Danish parliament consisting 
of the right-wing Danish People’s Party, the social-liberal Radical Party, and the left-wing 
Socialist People’s Party has tried to raise doubt about the bilateral agreement. The Danish 
People’s Party has requested a renegotiation of the bilateral agreement in order to enhance the 
financial commitment of the Germans. The Radical Party has suggested that the location of 
the bridge is changed, and Socialist People’s Party questioned the economic realism in the 
project (Folketingstidende, 2007). However, the opposition to the Femern bridge only 
represents a small parliamentary minority and it is not regarded as a series threat to the 
represents a minority in the parliament, and is not regarded as a serious threat by the 
supporters of the Femern bridge. Nevertheless, the actors in the Femern bridge network are 
rather tense. They are afraid that something might stall the process again. Consequently, all 
opinions and events that challenge the bilateral agreement are viewed with great suspicion.  
 
The Femern Belt Forum brought together a large number of public and private actors in a 
multi-level governance network that was highly successful in lobbying for a Femern Belt 
bridge. In that particular sense we might judge the governance network to be effective, but 
the crucial question remains: to what extent was the high-profiled governance network also 
democratically anchored? We shall briefly evaluate the governance networks in relation to 
the normative criteria spelt out above. 
 
Now, building a bridge over the Femern Belt is a highly controversial decision due to the 
uncertain economy and the uncertain effects on traffic patterns, environmental sustainability 
and regional development. With a length of about 28 kilometres the bridge will be one of the 
single most expensive infrastructure projects in Danish history. The Femern Belt Forum that 
has lobbied for the decision to build a Femern Belt bridge was formed by public authorities 
and it has had a considerable impact on policy making in both Denmark and Germany. The 
policy output will have a huge impact on citizens and corporate actors on both sides of the 
Femern Belt. As such, we can conclude that all the four anchorage points are relevant in the 
assessment of the democratic anchorage of the Femern Belt Forum. 
 
1st anchorage point: Democratic anchorage in elected politicians 
There is little doubt that the elected politicians at different levels have been aware of the 
presence and role of the governance network. Not only was the Femern Belt Forum a formal 
network initiated by local and regional politicians, but it was also highly visible in the sense 
that it contacted elected politicians at all levels, and at both sides of the border, through 
various kinds of lobbying activities such as petitions, meetings, conferences, etc. 
 
However, the elected politicians in the government and the Danish parliament did not assume 
the role of metagovernors vis-à-vis the governance network. Due to the lobbying role of the 
governance network it was the governance network that contacted the national politicians 
rather than the other way around. Nevertheless, the political authorities at the local and 
regional level exercised metagovernance in several ways. A number of elected politicians 
from the local municipalities and the regional County participated in the governance 
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network;3 the County created an administrative support unit underpinning the network; and 
the new regional body called Growth Forum aimed to frame the activities of the governance 
network politically and economically. 
 
The elected politicians and the public administrators at the local and regional level worked 
together to support the governance network on the basis of a clear understanding that the 
network was important in order to gain national support for a Femern bridge. In addition, the 
EU provided funding through its structural fund programme and knowledge through the 
production of expert reports. 
 
The multi-level metagovernance exercised by political authorities at the local, regional and 
transnational levels is important, but it is significant that the national politicians, who were 
the ones to take the authoritative decision about whether or not to build a bridge across the 
Femern Belt, failed to metagovern the governance network. Hence, whereas the local and 
regional politicians, who were in favour of the Femern Belt bridge, joined the network and 
actively supported its lobbying activities, the national politicians who were the target of these 
lobbying activities did not try to influence what was going on in the governance network. The 
national politicians did not formulate any clear objectives and did not combine hands-on and 
hands-off metagovernance tools. The Ministry of Traffic issued a few comprehensive reports 
with calculations of the costs and estimation of the effects on the transport sector, but it did 
not really aim to metagovern the Femern Belt Forum. There were only a few individuals in 
the ministry who were interested in the Femern Belt project. Although these individuals 
became a part of a national network named ‘Friends of the Femern Belt Bridge’, the Ministry 
of Traffic did not call the shots and its prediction that a final decision on the Femern Belt 
bridge would be taken in 2000 was completely misguided and ridiculed afterwards by the 
local governance network. 
 
In sum, we can conclude that the governance network has been democratically legitimized by 
the multi-level metagovernance exercised by the local and regional politicians and the 
transnational political authorities in the EU. However, democratic legitimacy could have been 
further enhanced if the national politicians had assumed responsibility for metagoverning the 
Femern Belt network. After all they were the key target of the lobbying activities of the 
network. 
 
2nd anchorage point: Democratic anchorage in participating groups and organisations  
In the negotiated interaction within the Femern Belt Forum it neither seems to be important 
who the network actors represent, nor whether they represent anybody at all. Representation 
is not an issue. The only thing that counts in the governance network is the knowledge, 
resources and energy that the different network actors bring to the table. However, the 
absence of explicit references to ‘representation’ in the network does not mean that the 
individual network actors do not claim to represent particular groups or organisations. Rather, 
it means that the network actors have free hands to construct themselves in terms of their 
representation.  
 
As a result there are huge differences in how the network actors perceive their role as 
representatives. For example, there is a trade union leader who claims that he only represents 
                                                 
3
 A member of parliament and member of the European parliament Freddy Blak was also a member of the 
Femern Belt Forum, but only in the initial stage. 
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himself, but another trade union leader claims that he represents both the regional labour 
market and the Regional Labour-market Council, which he is a member of and conceives as 
his hinterland. There is also a local business leader who claims to represent a number of 
specific business and employer organisations. He does not rely on their active support, but 
reckons that they will tell him if they disagree with what he is doing in the governance 
network. Finally, there is a large group of politicians from different local municipalities and 
from the Regional Council. They typically claim to represent the political body they come 
from, and this is important since there is an escalating struggle between the municipalities 
and the region about the future control with the Femern bridge project. 
 
Unfortunately, our data material does not permit us to make a thorough evaluation of whether 
the represented groups and organisations accept the validity of the network actors’ claim to 
represent them. However, so far there have not been any protests against the representatives 
in the governance network from the key stakeholder groups. Some of the local business men 
have contacted the business leader in the network about their growing concern for the 
emergence of bottlenecks in the local labour market, but that merely proves that they consider 
him as their representative. The absence of such protests might reflect that the stakeholders 
are ignorant of the governance network, but a more likely explanation is that the stakeholders 
feel that, until now, the members of the governance network have represented what all the 
stakeholders perceive as the common interests of all the stakeholders, namely the building of 
a bridge to Germany. 
 
Now, what we can say something about is the degree to which the representatives have a 
regular contact with the groups and organisations that they claim to represent. A regular 
contact is important as it creates opportunities for the represented groups and organisations to 
critically evaluate the way that their interests and preferences are pursued by the 
representatives. Again we have varied picture. One of trade union leaders reports that he has 
a close and regular contact with his hinterland. He discusses the agenda and the upcoming 
issues and decisions with the other members of the Regional Labour-market Council. The 
business leader does not consult the organisations that he claims to represent, but merely 
anticipates their reactions. The politicians in the network participate in regular meetings in 
their respective political bodies, but these meetings do not provide opportunities for critical 
feedback. The municipal representatives in the network also participate in meetings in the 
Municipal Contact Council, and this is a potent strategic forum capable of critically 
evaluating their performance in the Femern Belt network. 
 
There have been very few cases of dispute between the representatives and their hinterlands, 
but our impression is that the representatives have been sensitive to the criticisms that has 
been raised and tried to justify their actions and ideas. 
 
In sum, we can conclude that democratic legitimacy has been enhanced by the relatively 
well-developed relations of representation between the individual network actors and the 
groups and organisations that they claim to represent. However, the political importance of 
the network actors’ anchorage in represented groups and organisations is mitigated by the 
fact that the representation of different groups and interests hardly plays any role in the 
governance network because everybody agrees with its overall objective. Still, it is important 
for the democratic anchorage of the network that, with a few exceptions, there is a relatively 
close link between the representatives and the represented. 
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3rd anchorage point: Democratic anchorage in a territorially defined citizenry 
The meetings in the Femern Belt Forum have not been open to the general public. They were 
in the beginning when the local press was invited to the meetings as a part of the network’s 
strategy that aimed to mobilize local resources behind the Femern bridge project. But later 
when the network thought that the political battle was won, the number of participants was 
reduced and the local press was no longer a part of the network. However, the close relations 
to the overly positive local press persisted, although that did not necessarily enhance 
transparency. At least, there were a couple of incidents were the governance network tried to 
get the local press to scale down its coverage of the opposition to the bridge. Nevertheless, 
the local citizens had access to information about the network through the local press. A 
similar opportunity as not available to the rest of the Danish population since the national 
media did not cover the Femern bridge project very well. This can be explained a certain 
fatigue after having completed two other large bridge building projects. 
 
The interested citizens could get information about the Femern Belt Forum by visiting its 
homepage where the members and the organisational structure of the network were shown. 
One could also get access to a lot of highly relevant documents and reports about the Femern 
bridge project and get an overview of the activities organized by the network. However, 
critically to the issue of accountability, the agendas and minutes from the meetings in the 
Femern Belt Forum were not available on the homepage. 
 
The governance network produced a number of written and oral reports about the Femern 
bridge project. In the beginning the story-line was that the Femern Belt bridge would 
transform the island of Lolland from an economy periphery to a prosperous economic centre 
without harming the environment and without any costs to the tax payers as the bridge would 
be paid for by user fees. Later the story-line focussed on how the cross-border region would 
cope with the bridge building project and reap the fruits of the bridge. The reports and 
discussions were relatively open in the sense that they addressed critical issues as long as 
they did not problematize the relevance of the bridge. All this changed in 2000 where the 
governance network believed that the Danish parliament would formally endorse the Femern 
bridge project. When this did not happen and the political process stalled, the governance 
network became extremely tense and much less tolerant vis-à-vis critical voices. 
 
This change seriously affected the governance network’s ability to engage in a critical 
dialogue with people contesting their story-line and people aiming to broaden the project by 
introducing new elements into the story-line. But although the story-line and the dialogue 
became more rigid, closed and totalizing, there was still a certain willingness to discuss with 
opponents. For example, a group of German critics from Femern were invited to a conference 
organized by the Femern Belt Forum to discuss the project. Hence, the dialogue with the 
territorially defined citizens on both sides of the border was still there, although the network 
actors found it increasingly difficult to respond to critical voices and alternative suggestions 
as there was too much at stake. For example, the location of the Femern bridge was not open 
to discussion, despite that there were good arguments in favour of changing it. The 
willingness to discuss with the opponents differed among the network actors. Some network 
actors continued to engage in a constructive and respectful dialogue with people outside the 
network. Others developed a much more condescending attitude claiming that they had 
‘wasted too much time on the critics’, and that these ‘spoke against better judgement’. There 
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was also an incident where some of the network actors declined an invitation to come to a 
meeting in Germany to discuss the project. 
 
In sum, we can conclude that democratic legitimacy has been enhanced by the visibility and 
transparency of the governance network that permitted public scrutiny of its story-line and 
lobbying activities. The Femern Belt network is far from a hidden and secluded network 
where decisions are taken in smoke-filled rooms. There are reasonable good opportunities for 
the citizens to become learn about the network through the local press and the elaborate 
homepage. The more indirectly affected citizens have been able to raise criticism, and up to a 
certain point the governance network has engaged in a constructive debate with opponents. 
At the same time, there is considerable room for improvement on at least three different 
counts. First, there has been little coverage and debate about the Femern Belt bridge in the 
national press. Second, agendas and minutes from the meetings in the Femern Belt Forum 
have not been available on the homepage. Third, the governance network has deliberately 
aimed to close down the public debate in last couple of years out of fear of ‘unnecessary 
politicization’. 
 
4th anchorage point: Democratic anchorage in democratic rules and norms 
The criteria of inclusion and exclusion of network actors changed over time, but there was 
hardly any discussion of the criteria in the governance network and they were never made 
explicit. This has made it difficult for the world outside to understand who could become a 
part of the network and who could not. However, we have not heard of any actors that have 
been denied access. 
 
The implicit criteria of inclusion were formulated by the chairman of the Femern Belt Forum, 
Nils Wilhjelm, who from the outset favoured a broad inclusion of all actors interested in 
improving the local infrastructure and building a bridge to Germany. As such, the governance 
network included people from the municipalities, the County, the labour market 
organizations, financial institutions, educational institutions, tourism, agriculture, local 
business, etc. Also the critics of the bridge project such as environmental groups, the local 
ferry companies, the national railway company (DSB), and the local press were included in 
the network. As the administrative leader of the secretariat remarks: ‘We believed that it was 
better to include them in the discussion than to have them standing at the sideline and shout at 
us’. The broad inclusion of interested actors was not motivated by democratic concerns, but 
was an attempt to build a broad political alliance. Later on, in 2000 when the network actors 
thought that the final approval of the Femern Belt bridge was near, the number of network 
actors was reduced and the governance network became less inclusive. This change was 
largely accepted by the participants since they believed that the job was done and it could 
now be left to a few lead actors to see the project through. After the disappointment with the 
failure to get the final approval the governance network again became more inclusive as it 
now incorporated a number of local and regional politicians who could resume the lobbying 
activities. Recently, after the final decision has been made, some of the network actors want 
to transform the Femern Belt Forum into a small implementation network based on experts 
and public administrators, while others seek to replace the Femern Belt Forum with a local 
network bringing together the most intensely affected actors from Lolland. The latter has 
stirred up conflicts with the politicians and administrators from the Zealand Region who 
claim that all citizens in Zealand are intensely affected by the Femern bridge project. 
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The varying degrees of inclusiveness should not make us forget that three important groups 
have been systematically excluded from the Femern Belt Forum. First of all, there have been 
no representatives of the Danish tax payers who are going to pay for an eventual economic 
deficit. Second, the business firms and transport companies from the other Scandinavian that 
stand to benefit tremendously from a Femern bridge are not represented either. Last but not 
least, the more reluctant and critical actors on the German side of the border were initially 
invited to some of the meetings, but cultural differences and political controversies made it 
difficult to sustain their participation. So they have also been excluded. Of these three 
exclusions, the latter is by far the most problematic, since of three excluded groups the 
German citizens on the Femern peninsula are more intensely affected that both the Danish tax 
payers and the Scandinavian business people. 
To these external exclusions should be added the internal exclusions of those actors who are 
formally included, but tend to be marginalized in the decision making process. The public 
administrators and the labour-market organizations have the upper hand while the politicians 
and some of the other private actors have a hard time working their way through the piles of 
paper that are circulated in the network. 
 
However, the negotiated interaction among the included actors has been governed by a set of 
commonly accepted rules that tend to ensure that everybody gets to talk and that other people 
listen and respond in a civilized way and with proper respect. There has never been any 
voting. Decisions are taken on the basis of deliberation, and consensus formation is easy as 
everybody agrees on the basic idea of building a bridge across the Femern Belt. Written 
agendas and minutes tend to ensure transparency in the internal decision making process. 
 
Some of the network actors have probably been empowered by their participation in the 
network, but many of the key actors were already highly skilled and very competent when 
they joined the network. Technical skills and political competences are important due to the 
nature of the infrastructure project and the ambition to influence that national politicians and 
secure political support for the project. Some of long lasting members of the governance 
network complain that some of the less experienced actors have too little knowledge of what 
is going on, and that might indicate that the empowerment effects have been limited. 
 
The point where the governance network really fails is in relation to the demand for a self-
reflexive contribution to democratic innovation. The Femern Belt Forum does not see itself as 
a part of a wider democratic process and does not address the issue of how its internal 
democracy is functioning and how it could be improved. The governance network conceives 
itself as lobbying organisation which participates in a political game that it aims to win, and 
the forging of a strong and political alliance is more important than concerns for democratic 
innovation. 
 
In sum, we can conclude that democratic legitimacy has been enhanced by the re-enactment 
of some commonly accepted democratic rules and norms, while the failure to comply with 
other democratic demands has pull in the other direction. Hence, the network has included 
most of the relevant and affected actors on the Danish side of the border – even some of the 
critical voices were included in the initial phase in order to try to neutralize them and turn 
them into supporters. The internal interactions in the Femern Belt Forum have also been 
governed by democratic rules ensuring agonistic respect among the participants. However, 
there has been a problematic external exclusion of the critical actors on the German side and 
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a less serious internal exclusion of the politicians and some of the private actors who 
participated in the network. In addition, the empowerment effects have been limited and 
democratic innovations totally absent. 
 
An empirical assessment of the democratic anchorage of a particular governance network is 
not worth much, if it fails to arrive at final verdict. However, the final verdict should capture 
both the positive and negative findings in relation to the four anchorage points in order to 
facilitate the development of proactive strategies for improving the democratic performance. 
So, let us briefly review the conclusions in relation to the four anchorage points and see 
where it leads us. 
 
As for the democratic anchorage of the governance network in elected politicians, we 
concluded that the Femern Belt Forum was strongly anchored in metagoverning political 
authorities at the local, regional and transnational level, but that the national politicians, who 
were the primary target of the lobby activities of the network, failed to metagovern the 
network. The failure of the national politicians to metagovern the Femern Belt Forum is a 
serious drawback and, therefore, we will conclude that the democratic anchorage of the 
Femern Belt Forum in elected politicians is: MODERAT. 
 
As for the democratic anchorage of the governance network in the membership basis of the 
participating groups and organisations, we concluded that there were relative strong 
relations between the individual network actors and the groups and organisations that they 
claim to represent. Although the representation of different interests hardly plays any role in 
the consensus-based Femern Belt Forum, the democratic legitimacy of the governance 
network is enhanced by the fact that the represented groups and organisations seem to 
identify with their representatives. Hence, we can conclude that the democratic anchorage of 
the Femern Belt Forum in the participating groups and organisations is: STRONG. 
 
As for the democratic anchorage of the governance network in a territorially defined 
citizenry, we concluded that the visibility and transparency of the Femern Belt Forum 
facilitated public scrutiny of its story-line and lobbying activities and that the network, in the 
initial phase, tended to engage in a constructive dialogue with the opponents. However, the 
deliberate attempt to prevent public debate about sensitive issues in the last years up to the 
final decision, together with the scarce media coverage in the national press and the 
unavailability of agendas and minutes from the meetings in the Femern Belt Forum on the 
homepage, mean that we must conclude that the democratic anchorage of the Femern Belt 
Forum in a territorially defined citizenry is: MODERAT.  
 
As for the democratic anchorage of the governance network in a democratic grammar of 
conduct, we concluded that in the initial phase the Femern Belt Forum was quite inclusive 
and that agonistic respect was ensured by the re-enactment of commonly accepted rules for 
how to conduct a meeting and facilitate an open discussion. However, the problematic 
external exclusion of the critical and intensely affected citizens from the German side of the 
border, the limited empowerment effects, and the absence of self-reflexive attempts to 
enhance or improve the democratic functioning of the governance network mean that we 
must conclude that the democratic anchorage of the Femern Belt Forum in democratic rules 
and norms is: WEAK. 
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The overall verdict is that the democratic anchorage of the Femern Belt Forum is: 
MODERATE. There is a strong anchorage in the membership basis of the participating 
groups and organizations and a moderate anchorage in both elected politicians and the 
territorially defined citizenry. However, the anchorage in democratic rules and norms is weak 
and leaves a considerable room for improvement.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has aimed to link public administration research with political theory. The new 
interactive forms of governance through networks and partnerships are often reduced to non-
political managerial mechanisms for pragmatic problem-solving and evaluated merely in 
terms of their contribution to an effective governing of society. By contrast, we have argued 
that governance networks are arenas of political power struggles and partake in the 
authoritative definition and allocation of values and that this calls for an assessment of their 
democratic performance. The democratic quality of governance networks can be analysed in 
terms of their democratic anchorage.  
 
The argument presented in this paper has elaborated on the original model of democratic 
anchorage in three crucial ways. First, it has operationalized and contextualized the model in 
order to facilitate empirical analysis. Second, it has demonstrated how the democratic 
anchorage model can be used in an empirical case study of a governance network that has 
been formed in relation to a huge infrastructure project. Finally, it has shown how the 
qualitative measurement of the democratic performance of the Femern Belt Forum in relation 
to the four anchorage points can lead to a relatively clear verdict. 
 
The empirical application of the democratic anchorage model has revealed three crucial 
merits of the democratic anchorage model. As such, the model seems to be helpful in 
structuring a multi-dimensional assessment of the democratic performance of concrete 
governance networks on the basis of an analysis of qualitative data. In addition, the model 
can provide a nuanced understanding of the strengths and the weaknesses in the democratic 
performance of particular governance networks. Last but not least, it can help identifying 
shortcomings that can be addressed by proactive strategies aiming to enhance the democratic 
performance of governance networks. 
 
Some important tasks remain of which some are triggered by the empirical analysis presented 
above while others are of a more general nature. The empirical assessment of the Femern Belt 
Forum generates three crucial tasks. The first task is to further address the problems that arise 
from applying the democratic anchorage model in democratic audits of multi-level and cross-
border networks. For example, it becomes much harder to evaluate questions about 
metagovernance and inclusion in multi-level and cross-border networks. The second task is to 
reflect on how we should handle the dynamic development of governance networks in the 
assessment of their democratic anchorage. As such, the result of the evaluation of basic 
dimensions of democratic anchorage will tend to differ over time. The third task is to develop 
empirical methods for measuring the degree to which the represented groups and 
organisations identify with the network actors who claim to represent them. In our analysis 
this proved to be quite difficult to assess. 
 
Two final tasks of a more general nature should be mentioned. The first task concerns the 
development of a comparative approach to democratic auditing of governance networks that 
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can help identifying the structural and contingent factors determining the democratic quality 
of governance networks. The second task is to develop a systematic way of translating a 
critical diagnosis of democratic anchorage into proactive strategies for democratic 
metagovernors and into reflexive learning processes within governance networks. 
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